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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN T H E M A T T E R O F T H E 
M E N T A L CONDITION OF 
W A R D M., 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Salt Lake County 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE 
This is an action by one "Ward M" who was found 
to be mentally ill and in need of care and treatment, to 
determine (a) if the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stand-
ard should apply to involuntary hospitalization proceed-
ings, (b) if Utah Code Annotated 64-7-36 (H) (3) as 
amended is unconstitutionally vague, and (c) if the 
evidence supported the finding of the Court. 
Case No. 
13809 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
On June 13, 1974, application was filed with the 
Third District Court, requesting involuntary hospital-
ization of the appellant. Hearing was held before Marg-
aret K. Spratley, a special commissioner, who issued an 
order of hospitalization on June 26, 1974. Appellant 
petitioned for a new hearing which was held on August 
2, 1974, before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson. The 
Court found the appellant to be mentally ill and in need 
of custody, care and treatment in a mental facility. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Three designated examiners testified concerning 
the mental condition of "Ward M". The three doctors 
were unanimous in their conclusion that "Ward M" was 
mentally ill. (Tr. 6, 8, 11) They were also unanimous 
in their conclusion that "Ward M" lacked sufficient 
insight to continue and maintain treatment begun dur-
ing the period between his commitment and the hearing. 
(Tr. 5, 6, 8) The patient had indicated he might use 
L S D if it were legalized despite the fact it related to 
his early mental problems, (Tr. 5, 6) which were fairly 
long standing. (Tr. 2, 3) There was also concern re-
garding the patient's perception regarding the possible 
length of future treatment and future "cure". (Tr. 5) 
The patient also recognized that he had been "unwell" 
and had benefited from his term of hospitalization pend-
ing the hearing. (Tr. 19, 20) 
2 
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P O I N T I 
I N V O L U N T A R Y , H O S P I T A L I Z A T I O N 
P R O C E E D I N G W A S C O N S T I T U T I O N A L 
U N D E R B O T H F E D E R A L A N D S T A T E CON-
S T I T U T I O N S A N D D I D NOT D E N Y D U E 
PROCESS OF L A W . 
Involuntary hospitalization proceedings are not 
penal. They are equitable and designed for the benefit 
of a person who may be in need of hospitalization and 
treatment. Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 U 2d 12, 
447P2dl93. (1968) 
The proceedings are not adversary in nature. The 
state acts in its role of Parens Patriae. 
"Ordinarily, everyone connected with the pro-
ceeding is a friend of the patient. The doctors 
seek only to cure, if possible. The judge has no 
animosity towards the patient, nor has he any 
desire to cause the State to go to the expense of 
keep and treatment for one who does not need 
it. An attorney who would represent an insane 
patient would be remiss if he attempted to pre-
vent his client from receiving needed treatment." 
Bedford v. Salt Lake Co. Supra. 
Under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended Title 64 Chapter 7 Section 36(G) an indi-
vidual is afforded the opportunity to counsel. The ap-
pellant availed himself of that opportunity. There was 
no "adverse party" seeking the commitment of the ap-
pellant. There were only the doctors, appointed pur-
3 
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suant to the provisions of UC A 64-7-36 to report to the 
Court their findings as to the mental condition of the 
patient. There is surely no advantage to either the 
doctors or the state to seek the hospitalization of the 
appellant. 
I t is in the context of this type of civil hearing that 
the appellants seek to have the Court impose the crim-
inal law standard of proof applied to the determination 
of mental competency. I t is true as appellant avers in 
his brief that the Mental Health Services Act, Utah 
Code Annotated, Title 64 is silent as to the degree of 
proof required. Respondent is also unable to find any 
Utah cases setting forth the degree of proof required in 
involuntary hospitalization proceedings; however, in the 
case of Rawson v. Hardy 88U 131, 48 P2d 473 (1935) 
the court held that where a deed was sought to be set 
aside on the grounds of the incompetency of the grantor, 
. . . proof that a prior grantor was incompetent 
should be clear and indubitable, otherwise much 
harm could come to his grantees." 
Rawson v. Hardy p. 475 (emphasis provided) 
I 
If this degree of proof is a requisite in matters 
dealing with property, then certainly an equivalent de-
gree of proof would apply to the prospective loss of 
liberty of an individual. 
Further there exists a presumption of sanity which 
must be overcome. McDonald v. McDonald 236 P2d 
1066,120 IT 573 (1951). 
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In a number of cases, as where an adverse presump-
tion is to be overcome, clear and convincing evidence 
and more than a mere preponderance is required. 32A 
CJS Evidence Para. 1023. 
"Clear and convincing" and "clear, and indubitable" 
are higher degrees of proof than a mere preponderance. 
"Indubitable" proof has been held to be proof that 
makes out facts without a reasonable doubt. Olinger 
Mutual Benefit Association v. Christy, Colo., 342 P2d 
1000,1004,139 Colo 425 (1959) "Clear and convincing" 
proof must have reached a point where there is no seri-
ous or substantial doubt Jardine v. Archibald 279 P2d 
454,3U2d88, (1955). 
If then the requirement of proof is "clear and in-
dubitable" does this satisfy the requirements of due 
process? This burden of proof is much greater than a 
preponderance. Further it is, appropriately, a civil 
measure of proof for a civil action; the case of In the 
Matter of Levias 517 P2d 588, 83 Wash 2d 253 (1973) 
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington, cited by 
appellant in his brief, has held the standard of "clear, 
cogent and convincing" evidence to satisfy the require-
ments of due process. 
The fact that the court failed to apply the "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" standard is not a violation of due 
process. 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E LACK O F C A P A C I T Y S T A N D A R D 
OF 11 64-7-36 (H) (3) IS NOT C O N S T I T U T I O N -
A L L Y D E F I C I E N T . 
Appellant admits in his brief that "it [U.C.A. ff 64-
7-36 (H) (3)] does not, on its face, violate the tradi-
tional rationale of the Vagueness Doctorine." However, 
he urges it is unconstitutional because it allows too much 
discretion with the fact finder. 
The involuntary hospitalization statute provides for 
examination of the proposed patient by two ''designated 
examiners" who by definition are licensed physicians 
designated by the division of mental health as being 
specially qualified by training or experience in the diag-
nosis of mental or related illness. Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended Title 64 Chapter 7 Section 28 (d). 
If the Court after hearing the evidence, including the 
testimony of the designated examiners find (a) that the 
proposed patient is in need of custody, care or treat-
ment in a mental health facility, and (b) because of his 
illness lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make re-
sponsible decisions with respect to his hospitalization, it 
may order hospitalization. The need for hospitalization 
is based on a finding of mental illness in the proposed 
patient, basically a medical decision, and his state of 
mind at the time of hearing relating to his own percep-
tion of his problem and his ability to deal with it. Absent 
a finding of mental illness, which is a determination 
based upon the findings of two expert witnesses, the 
6 
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Court would have no opportunity to impose its predilec-
tions upon anyone. 
In the case before the court three qualified medical 
examiners concurred in the recommendation that the 
appellant receive further supervised treatment. This 
was not a case of the court penalizing what was merely 
a different behavior pattern. I t was treatment for what 
was diagnosed as a long standing mental problem (Tr. 
2, 3). The courts findings, under the statute, must be 
based on a finding of mental illness, plus the lack of 
insight of the patient to make responsible decisions with 
regard to hospitalization for that illness. These criteria 
are as objective as one can hope for in such a subjective 
area, and certainly not so vague as to render the statute 
unconstitutional. 
P O I N T I I I 
A P P E L L A N T M E T T H E S T A T U T O R Y 
GROUNDS FOR C O M M I T M E N T A T T H E 
T I M E OF H E A R I N G . 
The examiners agreed that the appellant required 
further supervised treatment. (Tr. 5, 6, 8) They fur-
ther agreed that he lacked the insight to follow up on 
that treatment on his own. Although the contingencies 
the examiners were concerned about were in the future, 
the court an dexaminers were concerned with the ap-
pellant's state of mind at the time of the hearing. The 
Court was obviously concerned with the appellant's 
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present perception of his problem and whether he fully 
appreciated and understood his vulnerability and the 
likelihood of regression if he failed to maintain proper 
treatment. The lack of insight related to appellants 
present perception of his illness as well as future con-
tingencies. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Respondents submit that the standard of proof in a 
committment proceeding is governed by the facts that 
the state is acting in its role as Parens Patriae and the 
proceeding is civil not criminal in nature. Therefore, 
the attempts to graft on the criminal standard as in 
In Re Gault 387 U S 1 (1967) and In Re Winship 397 
U S 358 (1970) are improper. The potential deprivation 
of liberty is of at least equal concern to the require-
ments of certainty in real property conveyances, there-
fore greater than a preponderance is necessary. I t is 
submitted that the appropriate civil standard of proof 
would be the equivalent of that set forth by Justice 
Wolfe in Rawson v. Hardy supra, i.e. "clear and in-
dubitable". The use of this standard would not violate 
the requirements of due process. 
The criteria of U C A 64-7-36 ( H ) (3) as amended 
are sufficiently objective, particularly the general 
requirements of the law appointing designated ex-
aminers to provide objective, expert testimony, to over-
come the allegation that they allow an unconstitutionally 
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broad area of judicial discretion. 
The evidence in the case before the court, being 
essentially uncontroverted, clearly sustained the finding 
of the court. Further it was "clear and indubitable" and 
"clear and convincing" leaving no serious or reasonable 
doubt as to the appellants need for hospitalization. 
The finding of the Lower Court should be sus-
tained. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
R. P A U L VAN D A M 
By: Richard S. Shepherd 
Deputy County Attorney 
C-220 Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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